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The logic of non-simultaneously decidable propositions
By Ernst Specker, Zu¨rich
[Translation1 by M.P. Seevinck of ‘die logik nicht gleichzeitig entscheidbarer aus-
sagen’ by Ernst Specker, Dialectica, vol. 14, 239 – 246 (1960).]
La logique est d’abord une science naturelle2.
F. Gonseth
The motto attached to this work is the subtitle of the chapter La physique de l’objet quel-
conque3 from the book Les mathe´matiques et la re´alite´4; this physics shows itself to be
essentially a form of classical propositional logic, by which, on the one hand, it5 obtains
a typical realisation, and, on the other hand, it5 is, in an almost obvious way, deprived of
its claim to absoluteness, with which it is occasionally dressed up. The following remarks
concur to this view and can be understood in this same empirical sense.
We assume a domain B of propositions and give ourselves the task of investigating the
structure of this domain. Such a structural description of B is only then possible when partic-
ular relations or operations are defined between the elements of B. The most simple relation
may very well be the one of implication ≪ a → b ≫ (a and b propositions of B), and it
will be the basis of the following investigations; we will not assume that the proposition
≪ a → b ≫ itself is also a proposition of B, when this is not otherwise excluded. Let us for
example consider the following example: The domain of B consists of the ten propositions:
≪ It is warm ≫ , ≪ It is cold ≫ , ≪ It is raining ≫ , ≪ It is snowing ≫ , ≪ The sun is shining ≫ , ≪ It
is not warm ≫ , ≪ It is not cold ≫ , ≪ It is not raining ≫ , ≪ It is not snowing ≫ , ≪ The sun is not
shining ≫ ; the implication ≪ a → b ≫ holds for some a, b in B, for some pairs it certainly
does not hold, whereas for others it may remain doubtful; examples are ≪ If it is warm, then
it is not cold ≫ , ≪ If it is cold, then it is snowing ≫ , ≪ If it is raining, then it is not snowing ≫ .
1Completed during a visit at the Center for Time, University of Sydney, Australia. Their hospitality is kindly acknowledged. Thanks
are also due to Eric Cavalcanti and Ru¨diger Schack for corrections on an earlier version.
2Logic is in the first place a natural science.
3The physics of any object whatsoever
4Mathematics and reality
5i.e, the classical logic of propositions
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In the following we will not concern ourselves with the problem indicated by the third ex-
ample, namely that the implication ≪ a → b ≫ can be doubtful for some pairs: for arbitrary
two propositions a, b of B it is the case that either ≪ a → b ≫ holds, or it does not hold.
Let us also call attention to the second example ≪ If it is cold, then it is snowing ≫ . Of this
implication we have said that it does not hold. But with this it is of course not asserted that
it can not be cold and snowing, but only that it is not always the case that when it is cold,
it is also snowing. This indicates that the propositions ≪ It is cold ≫ , etc, are not meant as
abbreviations for something like ≪ It is cold at 11.50 hrs. am on May 1st at the garden gate
of the property at 60 Goldauer street in Zu¨rich ≫ (maybe with further included more precise
specifications, in case these have been omitted) but in general (as ≪ forms of propositions ≫ ),
in the way they enter in the formulation of natural laws.
On the basis of the implication it is then possible to indicate when a proposition c of B can
be regarded to be the conjunction of the propositions a, b of B: For that it is firstly necessary
that the implications ≪ c → a ≫ and ≪ c → b ≫ hold (if a and b, then a ; if a and b, then b)
and that c obtains the following extremal requirement: if for some c′ in B it is the case that
≪ c′ → a ≫ and ≪ c′ → b ≫ , then also ≪ c′ → c ≫ (if it is the case that c′ implies a and c′
implies b, then also c′ implies a and b). It is now by no means self-evident that the domain B
contains an element that has these properties; in the example of ten propositions given above
there is, for example, no conjunction for any pair of distinct elements. However, it is of course
not excluded by this example that to a domain B there exists a more encompassing domain
B′ that has this closure, and more than this is not meant when it is said that to two arbitrary
propositions one can always associate a conjunction. However, before we turn to this question
it must be investigated whether the conjunction of two propositions is uniquely determined.
In case both c1 and c2 are conjunctions of a and b, then, according to our assessment, the
implications ≪ c1 → c2 ≫ and ≪ c2 → c1 ≫ hold (for which we also write ≪ c1 ↔ c2 ≫ , and we
say, c1 and c2 are equivalent). Equivalent propositions need not be identical (Example: ≪ it
is lightening and it is thundering ≫ , ≪ it is thundering and it is lightening ≫ ); because of this,
if uniqueness of the conjunction (and of the other combinations) is desired, one considers
instead of the propositions their equivalence classes, and it is shown that the equivalence
class of the conjunction of two propositions only depends on the equivalence classes of the
related propositions. In the case of classical logic one is directed in this way to the Boolean
lattices; however, an analogous procedure is possible in any other calculus of logic that can
be considered (such as in the intuitionistic, modal, or multiple-valued logic). The possibility
of the transition to equivalence classes assumes in the first place that the proper meaning of
the relation ≪ c ↔ d ≫ is an equivalence relation, that is, it has the properties of reflexivity
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( ≪ c ↔ c ≫ ), symmetry (if ≪ c ↔ d ≫ , then ≪ d ↔ c ≫ ) and of transitivity (if ≪ c ↔ d ≫ and
≪ d ↔ e ≫ , then also ≪ c ↔ e ≫ ). Of these properties the one of symmetry is fulfilled because
of the definition of ≪↔ ≫ out of the implication ≪→ ≫ ; the reflexivity ≪ c ↔ c ≫ is obtained
from the existence of the implication ≪ c → c ≫ . Because up until now we have not made any
assumptions about the implication, evidently ≪ c → c ≫ can not be proven, and indeed the
analysis of the concept of implication that will follow below gives us no reason to start from
≪ c → c ≫ . The transitivity of the relation ≪↔ ≫ is usually concluded from the transitivity
of the implication: In case ≪ c → d ≫ and ≪ d → e ≫ , then also ≪ c → e ≫ . It could
subsequently appear as if this transitivity as well as the existence of ≪ c → c ≫ is so tightly
connected to the concept of implication that it would be pointless to call a non-transitive
relation an ≪ implication ≫ . That this is not quite true should be exemplified by the following
story, which is situated a long time ago and in a far away country.
During the age of king Asarhaddon a wise man from Ninive taught at the school of
prophets in Arba’ila. He was an outstanding representative of his discipline (solar and lu-
nar eclipses) who was, except for the heavenly bodies, concerned almost exclusively about
his daughter. His teaching success was modest, the discipline was proved to be dry and re-
quired also previous mathematical knowledge, which was scarcely present. Although he did
not find the interest amongst the students that he had hoped for, it was however given to him
in abundance in a different field. No sooner had his daughter reached the marriageable age,
than he was bombarded with marriage proposals to her by students and young graduates. And
although he did not believe that he could keep her to himself forever, she was in any case still
far too young and her suitors were also in no way worthy of her. And in order for each of
them to convince themselves that they were unworthy, he promised them that she would be
the wife of he who would solve a prediction-task that was posed to them. The suitors were
led in front of a table on which three boxes were positioned in a row, and they were ordered
to indicate which of the boxes contained a gem and which were empty. And now no matter
how many times they tried, it seemed to be impossible to solve the task. After their predic-
tions, each of the suitors was ordered to open two boxes which they had indicated to be both
empty or both not empty: it turned out each time that one contained a gem and the other did
not, and, to be precise, sometimes the gem was in the first, sometimes in the second of the
boxes that were opened. But how can it be possible that from three boxes neither two can be
indicated as empty, nor as not empty? The daughter would have remained unmarried until
the father’s death, if she would not have swiftly opened two boxes herself after the prediction
of the son of a prophet, who indicated that precisely one should be filled and the other empty,
which turned out to be actually the case. At the weak objection by the father that he would
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have opened two other boxes, she attempted to open the third box, which turned out to be
impossible, after which the father declared in a mumbling way the not-falsified prediction as
valid.
In order to logically analyse the mentioned prediction-task we introduce the following
six propositions Ai, A∗i (i = 1, 2, 3), where Ai indicated that the i-th box is filled, A∗i that it is
empty. The attempts made by the suitors indicate that in the domain of these propositions the
following implications hold: Ai → A∗j , A∗i → A j (for each pair i, j of different numbers 1,2,3);
of course, also the implications Ai → Ai, A∗i → A∗i (i = 1, 2, 3) hold. Also, the implications
A1 → A
∗
2, A
∗
2 → A3 hold, whereas A1 → A3 does not hold, but only A1 → A∗3. It is clear
that, why not a single one of these three implications can be refuted, is only because it is
impossible to open all three boxes. We have hereby found an assumption without which the
deduction from the implication ≪ a → b ≫ , ≪ b → c ≫ to the implication ≪ a → c ≫ is
not possible without anything further ado: All of the propositions a, b, c must be verifiable
together. (The implication ≪ a → b ≫ must of course always be regarded in such a way
that a and b are verifiable together and that always when this is performed, with a also b is
satisfied.)
The difficulties that arise from propositions that are together not decidable emerge very
clearly from propositions about quantum mechanical systems. In accordance to the there
commonly used terminology [i.e., in that field], we would like to call the collection of such
propositions as not-simultaneously decidable; the logic of quantum mechanics was investi-
gated for the first time by von Neumann and Birkhoff [1]. We will return to their results later.
In a certain sense the scholastic speculations about the ≪ Infuturabilien ≫ 6 also belong here,
that is, the question whether the omniscience of God also extends to events that would have
occurred in case something would have happened that did not happen. (cf. e.g. [3], Vol. 3, p.
363.)
When we consequently take into account that not every collection of propositions is simul-
taneously decidable, then to the description of the structure of a collection B of propositions
belongs, besides the implication, also the set Γ of subcollections of B that are simultaneously
decidable. If for two elements a, b of B it is the case that ≪ a → b ≫ holds, then (a, b) is in Γ.
Because we assume in particular for each a that ≪ a → a ≫ (a) is in Γ, that is, B does not con-
tain any undecidable propositions. We now further assume that the implication is transitive,
and, consequently, that under ≪↔ ≫ B falls apart in classes of equivalent propositions. How-
ever, in order to be able to go from B to the collection B′ of equivalence classes, we need the
further assumption that the set Γ is compatible with the arrangement into classes, that is, for
6To be translated as something like ‘future contingencies’.
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example, when (a, b) is in Γ and it is the case that ≪ a ↔ a′ ≫ , that then also (a′, b) is in Γ. This
we would now like to assume and we then get a collection B′ with a relation ≪→ ≫ which
partly orders B′, and also a set Γ′ of subsets of B′; Γ′ contains all singletons, with each set [it
contains all] its subsets, and in case ≪ a → b ≫ the set (a, b). Birkhoff and von Neumann have
shown that the set B′ that is assigned in this way to the set of propositions B about a quan-
tum mechanical system is isomorphic to the collection of linear and closed subspaces of a
complex Hilbert space (which in particular cases can be a unitary space); the implication cor-
responds to the relation of containment. A collection C of subspaces corresponds precisely
then to a collection from Γ′, when there is a unitary basis for the space which contains a basis
for each subspace of C. It can be shown that this is already the case when there is two by two
such a basis for spaces from C; this requirement is precisely then obeyed when, in the sense
of elementary geometry, the subspaces are orthogonal, that is, when the completely orthogo-
nal complement of the intersection cuts the subspaces into completely orthogonal spaces. A
collection of propositions about a quantum mechanical system is consequently precisely then
simultaneously decidable, when they are two by two [simultaneously decidable]. Further,
it can easily be shown that each such collection of propositions is contained in a Boolean
lattice, that is, for them classical logic holds. (A corresponding assumption appears also in
a general theory as natural.) It is in particular the case that a negation ¬a is related to every
proposition a; ¬a is only then simultaneously decidable with b when a is [simultaneously
decidable] with b. To two simultaneously decidable propositions a, b is related a conjunction
and disjunction, and all these propositions are simultaneously decidable. On the basis of the
above indicated characterization it is possible to also relate a conjunction and, analogously,
a disjunction to non-simultaneously decidable propositions; in the totality of subspaces of a
Hilbert space these operations correspond to the intersection and the spanned subspace. In
contradistinction to the work of Birkhoff and von Neumann we have to give this up here,
because it is essential to the problems to be considered that the operations are only defined
for simultaneously decidable propositions. For we want to devote ourselves to the question
whether it is possible to embed the totality of (closed) subspaces of a Hilbert space into a
boolean lattice in such a way that the negation and also the conjunction and disjunction, in
so far as they are defined (that is, for orthogonal subspaces) retain their meaning. The ques-
tion can also be formulated more visually in the following way: Is it possible to extend the
description of a quantum mechanical system through the introduction of supplementary —
fictitious — propositions in such a way that in the extended domain the classical proposi-
tional logic holds (whereby, of course, for simultaneously decidable proposition negation,
conjunction and disjunction must retain their meaning)?
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The answer to this question is negative, except in the case of Hilbert spaces of dimen-
sion 1 and 2. In the case of dimension 1, the lattice of subspaces is the Boolean lattice of
two elements. In the case of dimension 2, the lattice of subspaces can be described in the
following way: Consider subspace H (total space), O (space consisting of the null vector)
and Aa, Ba (with a a set that ranges over the cardinality of the continuum); H and O are
orthogonal to all subspaces, also Aa and Ba [are orthogonal] to H, O, Aa and Ba. The com-
plement (negation) of Aa is Bb and vice versa, the negation of H is O and vice versa. The
conjunction of Aa and Ba is O, their disjunction is H; H and O are the identity element and
null element of the ≪ partial lattice ≫ : O ∨ C = C, O ∧ C = O, H ∨ C = H, H ∧ C = C (C
is an arbitrary subspace). It is easy to see that this structure can be embedded in a Boolean
lattice. That such an embedding is not possible from dimension 3 and higher follows from
the fact that it [this embedding] is not possible for a three-dimensional space. For the sake
of visualisability we will restrict ourselves to the real orthogonal space which is contained in
the unitary space, for which the embedding-protocol then is the following: The totality of lin-
ear subspaces of a three-dimensional orthogonal vector space can be mapped one-to-one to a
Boolean lattice in such a way that for arbitrary orthogonal subspaces a, b the following holds
f (a∧ b) = f (a)∧ f (b), f (a∨ b) = f (a)∨ f (b), and that the image of the null space and of the
total space are, respectively, the null element and the identity element of the Boolean lattice.
Because each Boolean lattice can be mapped homomorphically on a Boolean lattice of two
elements, the solution to the embedding problem gives rise to the solution to the following
prediction-task: Every linear subspace of a three dimensional orthogonal vector space must
be assigned one of the values t (rue), f (alse) in such a way that the following requirements
are met: The total space is assigned t, the null space f ; if a and b are orthogonal subspaces
then their intersection a ∧ b is assigned the value t if and only if both are assigned the value
t, and the subspace a∨ b spanned by them is assigned the value t if and only if at least one of
the subspaces a, b is assigned the value t.
An elementary geometrical argument shows that such an assignment is impossible, and
that therefore it is impossible to have consistent predictions about a quantum mechanical
system (not considering exceptional cases).
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